EDITOR’S NOTE: This is part one of a two-part article on clinical systems cybersecurity.
By Don L. Seven
Connected clinical technology has expanded what healthcare technology management (HTM) teams are expected to understand, document and help secure. The next challenge is not simply adding cybersecurity tasks to HTM workloads. It is building the inventory, authority, technical fluency and shared accountability needed to act on those tasks responsibly.
HTM’s Changing Role in Clinical Systems Cybersecurity
As connected clinical technology continues to replace legacy clinical systems and healthcare networks become increasingly integrated, HTM professionals will face greater cybersecurity accountability, increased involvement in vulnerability remediation, stronger demands for original equipment manufacturer coordination and a larger role in life cycle and replacement decisions.
That shift is already visible in daily work. A vulnerability can be discovered by a security platform, but the finding quickly raises questions that a scanner in most cases cannot answer for medical equipment: What actual piece of equipment is affected? Which software version is installed? Is the system still supported? Can it be removed from service? Has the manufacturer approved a correction? Who can authorize downtime? Who owns the decision if no supported fix exists?
In my experience working across clinical technology and cybersecurity, identifying a vulnerability is often the easy part. The harder problem is determining who has the information, authority and operational ability to move it forward. A finding without an accountable next step is not risk management. It is just discovery and documentation of a problem.
Medical Device Inventory Is Becoming Security Infrastructure
Traditional equipment records were often designed to support maintenance: manufacturer, model, serial number, location, preventive-maintenance history and service status. Those fields remain essential, but they are no longer enough for connected clinical systems.
Organizations increasingly need to associate a device or system with its operating system, application version, IP and MAC addresses, network segment, remote-access method, clinical owner, support status, manufacturer guidance and known cybersecurity findings. If those records are split among HTM, IT, procurement, cybersecurity and the manufacturer, even a legitimate vulnerability can stall before anyone confirms what is actually affected.
Full and proper inventory control therefore becomes more than an administrative exercise. It creates the foundation for vulnerability validation, mitigation and remediation planning, segmentation, replacement decisions and credible risk documentation.
HTM Will Need Practical IT Fluency
HTM professionals do not need to become cybersecurity engineers, but basic IT knowledge is becoming difficult to separate from effective clinical-equipment management. Understanding operating systems, basic OS navigation, ports, network paths, authentication, remote support, software versions and common security terminology allows HTM to communicate across departments and recognize when a proposed action may affect clinical operation.
At the same time, IT and cybersecurity teams may understand the technical exposure while lacking knowledge of the system’s clinical function, maintenance restrictions, manufacturer relationship and consequences of downtime. Neither side holds the complete picture independently.
Training should support informed participation rather than forced career conversion. The goal is not to turn every biomedical equipment technician into a threat hunter and researcher. It is to ensure HTM can identify the right questions, interpret manufacturer guidance, recognize operational constraints and escalate appropriately.
Preparation Must Be Organizational
Regulatory and manufacturer expectations are reinforcing this shift. Proposed updates to the HIPAA Security Rule would make activities such as technology asset inventories, network mapping, risk analysis, patch-management practices, segmentation, compliance audits and compensating-control documentation more explicit. HIPAA does not assign these duties specifically to HTM, but many depend on information HTM maintains or is best positioned to validate.
Preparation should also begin before equipment is purchased. Cybersecurity review during acquisition can identify operating-system lifespan, patch availability, remote-access requirements, logging capabilities, upgrade costs, support limitations and end-of-life expectations. The cheapest purchase price can become an expensive life-cycle problem if the system cannot be securely maintained.
Connected clinical technology has made cybersecurity part of HTM’s environment. HTM brings knowledge that vulnerability scanners and traditional IT teams cannot reproduce from technical data alone: how equipment is maintained, how it supports patient care, what the manufacturer permits, what downtime means and whether a proposed action is operationally realistic.
That expertise makes HTM indispensable, but participation should not be confused with isolated responsibility. Successful clinical-systems cybersecurity depends on combining HTM’s clinical-technology knowledge with cybersecurity’s threat expertise, IT’s infrastructure control, clinical leadership’s operational judgment, manufacturer support and leadership accountability. Biomedical and HTM organizations are already beginning to experiment with integrating some of these traditionally separate cybersecurity functions into their service models, signaling an emerging shift in how clinical technology and cybersecurity responsibilities may be structured.
Related: Learn how to build a continuity of operations plan in this month’s cybersecurity column, Why It’s Time to Re-COOP.
